We show that the model checking problem for intuitionistic propositional logic with one variable is complete for logspace-uniform AC 1 . For superintuitionistic logics with one variable, we obtain NC 1 -completeness for the model checking problem.
Introduction
The interplay between computational complexity and logic is one of the driving forces in complexity theory. The study of NP was initiated by the NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem for propositional logic (Cook 1971b) , and meanwhile, there are satisfiability, validity, and model checking problems for a tremendous variety of logics that characterize complexity classes in terms of computational completeness.
In this paper, we investigate the complexity of the model checking problem (also called the formula evaluation problem) for intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. Intuitionistic logic (see e.g. Mints 2000 ) is a part of classical logic that can be proven using constructive proofs. For example, the law of the excluded middle a ∨ ¬a and the weak law of the excluded middle ¬a ∨ ¬¬a do not have constructive proofs and are not valid in intuitionistic logic. Not 638 Mundhenk & Weiss cc 23 (2014) surprisingly, constructivism has its costs. Whereas the validity problem is coNP-complete for propositional logic (Cook 1971b) , for intuitionistic propositional logic, it is PSPACE-complete (Statman 1979; Švejdar 2003) even with two variables (Rybakov 2006) .
The model checking problem for IPC is the problem to determine whether a given formula is satisfied by a given intuitionistic Kripke model. We use Kripke semantics, since other semantics for intuitionistic logic like Heyting semantics (Heyting 1971) are not suited for model checking. Moreover, modal logics into which intuitionistic logic can be embedded also use Kripke semantics as their standard semantics. The model checking problem for IPC is P-complete (Mundhenk & Weiss 2010) , even for the fragment with two variables only (Mundhenk & Weiss 2012) . In contrast, the formula value problem for propositional logic is NC 1 -complete (Buss et al. 1992 ) independent of the number of variables.
A bit surprisingly, for intuitionistic logic with one variable IPC 1 , we show the complexity of the model checking problem to be intermediate between P and NC 1 , namely AC 1 -complete. To our knowledge, this is the first "natural" AC 1 -complete problem, whereas other known AC 1 -complete problems (see e.g. Beaudry & McKenzie 1995) have some explicit logarithmic bound in the problem definition. A basic ingredient for the AC 1 -completeness lies in normal forms for formulas (Nishimura 1960 ) and for models (Gabbay 1981) . These normal forms can essentially be used to encode formulas resp. Kripke models as natural numbers, called formula index 1 resp. model index. Model checking then is simply a comparison of these indices. We show that calculation of the formula index is in LOGdetCFL (what is close to logspace), whereas it is P-hard to calculate the model index. Nevertheless, we obtain AC 1 as upper bound for model checking. Roughly speaking, if the formula index is smaller than the model index, then the model does not satisfy the formula. Therefore, the model checking algorithm can finish the calculation of the model index when it is ensured that the model index is greater than the formula index. The resources used by such a model checking algorithm can be shown to depend mainly on the formula it gets as input and not on the model. cc 23 (2014) IPC 1 model checking is AC 1 -complete 639
Since formulas turn out to have very small indices, we eventually obtain an AC 1 -algorithm for the model checking problem. Its AC 1 -hardness follows from a construction that simulates the evaluation of a Boolean circuit in terms of model checking. The small index property of formulas is crucial for both the upper and the lower bounds. If we use a compact representation of formulas as graphs instead, this property gets lost and the appropriate model checking problem becomes P-complete.
Classical propositional logic is the extension of IPC with the axiom a ∨ ¬a. Those proper extensions of intuitionistic logic are called superintuitionistic logics. For example, the superintuitionistic logic KC (see Dummett & Lemmon 1959) results from adding ¬a ∨ ¬¬a to IPC. We show that the model checking problem for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable is NC 1 -complete (and easier than that for IPC 1 ). In contrast, for the superintuitionistic logic KC with two variables, it is known to be P-complete and as hard as for IPC with two variables (Mundhenk & Weiss 2012) . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notations, we use for intuitionistic logic and model checking, and the fundamental results of Nishimura (1960) on IPC 1 . In Section 3, we present upper bounds for the index computations that yield the AC 1 -algorithm for the IPC 1 model checking. The following Section 4 presents our lower bounds. Section 5 deals with the complexity of the model checking problem and the validity problem for superintuitionistic logics with one variable. The implied completeness for the model checking for intuitionistic logics and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Complexity (see e.g. Vollmer 1999). The notion of reducibility we use is the logspace many-one reducibility ≤ log m , except for NC 1 -hardness, where we use first-order reducibility. AC 1 (resp. NC 1 ) is the class of sets that are decided by families of logspaceuniform circuits (resp. U cc 23 (2014) AC 1 , there is no bound on the fan-in of the gates (unbounded fan-in). ALOGTIME denotes the class of sets decidable by alternating Turing machines in logarithmic time, and we will use that NC 1 = ALOGTIME (see Ruzzo 1981) . L denotes the class of sets decidable by logspace Turing machines. We use ALOGSPACE[f (n)] to denote the class sets decidable by alternating logspace Turing machine that make O(f (n)) alternations, where n is the length of the input. We will use that AC 1 = ALOGSPACE[log n] (see Cook 1985) . LOGdetCFL is the class of sets that are ≤ log m reducible to deterministic context-free languages (Sudborough 1978) . It is also characterized as the class of sets decidable by deterministic Turing machines in polynomial time and logarithmic space with additional use of a stack (Cook 1971a) . The inclusion structure of the classes we use is as follows.
Intuitionistic propositional logic (see e.g. van Dalen 2004).
Let VAR denote a countable set of variables. The language IL of intuitionistic propositional logic is the same as that of propositional logic PC, i.e., it is the set of all formulas of the form
where p ∈ VAR. For i ≥ 0, the languages IL i are the subsets/fragments of IL for which VAR consists of i variables. In this paper, we mainly consider IL 1 (i.e., formulas with one variable).
As usual, we use the abbreviations ¬φ := φ → ⊥ and := ¬⊥. Because of the semantics of intuitionistic logic, one cannot express ∧ or ∨ using → and ⊥.
An intuitionistic Kripke model for intuitionistic logic is a triple M = (U, , ξ), where U is a nonempty and finite set of states, is a preorder on U (i.e., a reflexive and transitive binary relation), and ξ : VAR → P(U ) is a function 2 -the valuation function. Informally speaking, to any variable, it assigns the set of states in which cc 23 (2014) IPC 1 model checking is AC 1 -complete 641 this variable is satisfied. The valuation function ξ is monotone in the sense that for every p ∈ VAR, a, b ∈ U : if a ∈ ξ(p) and a b, then b ∈ ξ(p). (U, R) can also be seen as a directed graph.
Given an intuitionistic Kripke model M = (U, , ξ) and a state s ∈ U , the satisfaction relation for intuitionistic logics |= is defined as follows.
A formula φ is satisfied by an intuitionistic Kripke model M in state s if M, s |= φ. For some examples see Figure 2 .1. A formula is valid if it is satisfied by every intuitionistic Kripke model in every state. From the monotonicity of ξ and the definition of |= follows the monotonicity for every formula, i.e., for φ ∈ IL, s, t ∈ U and
The most interesting connective is → because its evaluation in a state is affected by every successor state. The (intuitionistic) negation is a special implication. We use ¬φ as abbreviation for φ → ⊥.
The disjunction ¬a ∨ a is not satisfied in w 1 in M 1 (Figure 2 .1) because neither a is assigned to w 1 nor ¬a is satisfied there. Since w 1 has an a satisfying successor, ¬a is not satisfied there. The formula ¬a → a is not satisfied in v 1 because it has a successor namely v 3 that satisfies ¬a but not a. Also (¬a → a) ∨ (¬a ∨ a) is not satisfied in v 1 because even ¬a ∨ a is not satisfied there.
Properties of IL 1 formulas. The set IL 1 of formulas with at most one variable is partitioned into infinitely many equivalence 3 classes (Nishimura 1960) . This was shown using the formulas that are inductively defined as follows (see e.g. Gabbay 1981 ). We use a for the only variable.
The length of the Rieger-Nishimura formulas grows exponentially if they are represented as strings. If one represents them as graphs, the size grows much slower (see Figure 6 .1).
Theorem 2.1 (Nishimura 1960) . Every formula in IL 1 is equivalent to exactly one of the Rieger-Nishimura formulas.
In the following, we use [φ] := {α | α ≡ φ} to denote the equivalence class that contains φ. The equivalence classes of IL 1 form a free Heyting algebra (see McKinsey & Tarski 1946; Nishimura 1960 )-the Rieger-Nishimura lattice (see Figure 2 .2). The lattice operations are , , and and [α] [β] = [α → β] for α, β ∈ IL 1 . The algebraic details are explained below and can be skipped (see also Johnstone 1982) .
The Rieger-Nishimura lattice (see Figure 2 .2) is given by the 5-tuple ({a}, , , , ⊥) , whereas a denotes the only variable that occurs in the formulas of IL 1 . The induced partial order is denoted (1960) 
Nishimura
Furthermore Nishimura (1960) shows some properties of the operations of the Rieger-Nishimura lattice. We describe these properties as equivalences of Rieger-Nishimura formulas in Theorem 2.2. A similar version is given by Gabbay (1981) in the proof of Theorem 7 of Chapter 6.1. For example because of
Theorem 2.2 (see Nishimura 1960) . The following equivalences hold for all Rieger-Nishimura formulas α.
Properties of IPC 1 models. In order to prove Theorem 2.1, Gabbay (1981) uses what we call canonical models. For n ≥ 1, we define the canonical models H n = (W n , , ξ n ) as follows (see Gabbay (1981) , Chapter 6.1, Definitions 3 and 5, Lemma 6). 
cc 23 (2014) IPC 1 model checking is AC 1 -complete 645 Figure 2 .3: The canonical models H 9 and H 10 (reflexive and transitive edges are not depicted, ξ n (a) = {1} is indicated by the doublecircle for state 1).
Together with Theorem 2.1, this shows that every IL 1 formula has one or two minimal models in which it is not satisfied. Due to the monotonicity of intuitionistic logic, the formula is not satisfied in every larger model.
The model checking problem. This paper examines the complexity of model checking problems for intuitionistic logic with one variable.
φ, M, s , where φ ∈ IL 1 , M is an intuitionistic Kripke model, and s is a state of M.
We assume that formulas and intuitionistic Kripke models are encoded in a straightforward way. This means, a formula is given as a string, and the graph (U, R) of an intuitionistic Kripke model is given by its adjacency matrix that takes |U | 2 bits.
Upper bounds
The main goal of this section is to show that the model checking problem for IPC 1 is in AC 1 . Initially, we consider the formulas in IL 1 . Every formula can be represented as the pair of index k and type (ϕ or ψ) of the equivalent Rieger-Nishimura formula cc 23 (2014) ϕ k resp. ψ k (Theorem 2.1). We call this pair Rieger-Nishimura index. In Lemma 3.1, we show that the Rieger-Nishimura index of a formula is at most logarithmic in the size of the formula. This is used in an algorithm that decides the Rieger-Nishimura index of a formula in LOGdetCFL (Lemma 3.3). In the second part, we consider models for IPC 1 . Gabbay (1981) has shown that every such model has a homomorphic canonical model H n . We show that this model index n of a given model can be decided in alternating logspace (Theorem 3.6). Eventually, we combine the computations of the Rieger-Nishimura index and the model index and obtain an algorithm for the model checking problem that shows that the problem is in AC 1 (Theorem 3.7).
Formulas.
We define a function RNindex that maps every formula to the index of its equivalent Rieger-Nishimura formula. We call this the Rieger-Nishimura index.
Our first observation is that the index of every formula is very small. Let rank (α) be the first element-the integer-of the RNindex (α) pair. The length |α| of the formula α is the number of appearances of variables, connectives, and constants in α.
Proof. The proof relies on the following technical claim. Let fib(n) denote the n-th Fibonacci number. For the induction step, let
with |α| > 1 and α = β γ with ∈ {→, ∧, ∨}. Then |α| = |β| + |γ| + 1, and using the induction hypothesis, we obtain |α| ≥ fib(rank (β)) + fib(rank (γ)) + 1. We have to distinguish the following cases. (For the lattice operations see Theorem 2.2.)
. This leads to = ∨ and can be treated analogously to the case γ ∈ [⊥] because both ∧ and → are ruled out by
) and it follows from the induction hypothesis that |α| > fib(rank (α)).
The remaining cases. From the induction hypothesis follows
that |α| ≥ fib(rank (β)) + fib(rank (γ)). With respect to the Rieger-Nishimura lattice, we have to handle two cases.
(b) rank (α) > rank (β) and rank (α) > rank (γ). In this case, it holds that one of the ranks of β and γ needs to be ≥ rank (α) − 2 and the other ≥ rank
cc 23 (2014) Claim 3.2 shows |φ| ≥ fib(rank (φ)). Because of the exponential growth of the Fibonacci numbers (fib(n) ≥ Φ n where Φ denotes the golden ratio), it follows that rank (φ) ≤ c · log(|φ|) where c is independent of φ. This proves Lemma 3.1.
In order to analyze the complexity of the Rieger-Nishimura index computation, we define the following decision problem.
Lemma 3.3. EqRNformula is in LOGdetCFL.
Proof. Algorithm 1 decides EqRNformula according to the Rieger-Nishimura lattice of the equivalence classes of IL 1 . We can analogously define the lattice operations , , and for the Rieger-Nishimura indices instead of the equivalence classes.
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The correctness of Algorithm 1 follows straightforward from Theorem 2.2 because the lattice operations for equivalence classes and indices (as defined in footnote 5) are the same. With Lemma 3.1, it follows that every variable value used in Algorithm 1 can be stored in logarithmic space (even in loglogspace). The algorithm walks recursively through the formula and computes the index of every subformula once, hence running time is polynomial. (Note that the lattice operations are in loglogspace via the table look up according to Theorem 2.2.) All information that is necessary for recursion can be stored on the stack. Therefore, Algorithm 1 can be implemented on a polynomial time logspace machine that uses an additional stack, i.e., a LOGdetCFL-machine.
Algorithm 1 is a quite straightforward algorithm that does not try to save space by splitting the formula into parts of equal length. We conjecture that using the technique from Buss et al. (1992) together with the Rieger-Nishimura theory of IPC 1 yields that cc 23 (2014) IPC 1 model checking is AC 1 -complete 649 Algorithm 1 Rieger-Nishimura index check.
Require: a formula φ ∈ IL 1 and a Rieger-Nishimura index (i, x) 1: if RNIndex-calc(φ) = (i, x) then accept else reject 2: function RNIndex-calc(ψ) // returns a Rieger-Nishimura index 3: if ψ = a then return (1, psi ) 4: else if ψ = then return (0, ) 5:
and L.
Models. We define a function h that maps an intuitionistic
Kripke model M and a state w of M to the index i of the corresponding 7 canonical model H i . We will use h in the algorithm that decides the index of the canonical model that corresponds to a state of an arbitrary given intuitionistic Kripke model. Let M = (U, , ξ) be an intuitionistic Kripke model and w be a state of M. We define two abbreviations for w ∈ U .
The function h is defined as follows. Next, we show that h is reasonably defined. We express this in a way similar to Theorem 2.3. 
Proof. From Theorem 2.3 it follows that Theorem 3.4 is equivalent to the following claim. 
Proof of Claim. We prove this by induction on rank (α). Let M = (U, , ξ) be an intuitionistic Kripke model, w ∈ U a state, and α a Rieger-Nishimura formula. The case rank (α) ∈ {0, 1} is clear. For the induction step, let rank (α) > 1. We distinguish two cases. The case α = ψ k is clear because ψ k = ϕ k−1 ∨ ψ k−1 and the claim follows directly from the induction hypothesis. In the second case, we have α = ϕ k .
The equivalence between (1) and (2) is clear due to the definition of →. From the induction hypothesis follows the equivalence between (2) and (3). (3) and (4) ,w) . The definition of the canonical models, i.e., H x is a submodel of H h (M,w) , causes the equivalence between (4) and (5). The last equivalence between (5) and (6) comes from the definition of →, and the construction of
To compute the model index for a given state, one needs the resources of an alternating logspace Turing machine. The function h can be implemented according to its definition straightforwardly as a logarithmically space bounded alternating algorithm. It requires an alternation depth of at most size of the given model due to the construction of h. It follows from the definition of h that i is also an upper bound for the number of alternations. Since P = ALOGSPACE[poly] (Chandra et al. 1981) , it follows immediately that this problem is in P. Resources used by Algorithm 2. Let φ, M, s be the input. In line 1 Algorithm 2 guesses a Rieger-Nishimura index (r, x). The decision in line 2 whether φ, (r, x) ∈ EqRNformula can be done with the resources of LOGdetCFL (Lemma 3.3). To decide for a given intuitionistic Kripke model M, a state w of M, and an integer n the problem "Does h(M, w) = n hold?" is in ALOGSPACE[n] (Theorem 3.6). It requires an alternation depth of at most n due to the construction of h. Hence, the decision in line 6 (resp. line 9) whether h(M, s) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} (resp. h(M, s) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} ∪ {r + 1}) can be done with r (resp. r + 1) alternations. Since r is at most about c · log(|φ|) (Lemma 3.1), these decisions can be done with the resources of ALOGSPACE[log(| φ, M, s |)]. During the complete computation, the algorithm only needs to store a constant number of Rieger-Nishimura indices and model indices. According to Lemma 3.1 and the fact that h(M, w) ≤ |M|, Algorithm 2 requires logarithmic space. Since LOGdetCFL ⊆ AC 1 = ALOGSPACE[log n] (see Cook 1985) , we obtain the desired upper bound.
Lower bounds
In this section, we give hardness results that essentially rely on the hardness of computing the model index. We show how to transform an alternating graph into an intuitionistic Kripke model, such that the alternating graph accessibility problem is expressed as the question whether the constructed model has a certain index. The model index problem is the problem to decide given a Kripke model and a number, whether the number is the model index of the model. The alternating graph accessibility problem is P-complete (Chandra et al. 1981) ; thus, we conclude P-hardness of the model index problem (Theorem 4.4). We first define an AC 1 -hard graph problem, that is similar to the P-complete alternating graph accessibility problem (Chandra et al. 1981 ) but has some additional regularity properties. Then, we give a construction that transforms such a graph into an intuitionistic Kripke model. This transformation is the basis for the reduction from the alternating graph accessibility problem to the model checking problem for IPC 1 .
Alternating graph problems.
The alternating graph accessibility problem is shown to be P-complete in (Chandra et al. 1981) . We use the following restricted version of this problem that is very similar to Boolean circuits with and-and or-gates (and input-gates). An alternating slice graph (Mundhenk & Weiss 2010 ) G = (V, E) is a directed bipartite acyclic graph with a bipartitioning V = V ∃ ∪ V ∀ , and a further partitioning
(All edges go from slice V i to slice V i−1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , m − 1.) All nodes excepted those in the last slice V 0 have a positive outdegree. Nodes in V ∃ are called existential nodes, and nodes in V ∀ are called universal nodes. Alternating paths from node x to node y are defined as follows by the property apath G (x, y).
(1) apath G (x, x) holds for all x ∈ V, (2a) for x ∈ V ∃ : apath G (x, y) iff ∃z ∈ V ∀ : (x, z) ∈ E and apath G (z, y),
The problem AsAgap is similar to the alternating graph accessibility problem, but for the restricted class of alternating slice graphs. 
Problem
As with the alternating graph accessibility problem, AsAgap is P-complete (Mundhenk & Weiss 2010, Lemma 2). The following technical Lemma is not hard to prove.
Lemma 4.1. For every set A in (logspace-uniform) AC 1 , there exists a function f that maps instances x of A to instances f (x) = G x , s x , t x of AsAgap and satisfies the following properties. (i) f is computable in logspace.
(ii) G x is an alternating slice graph of logarithmic depth; i.e., if G x has n nodes, then it has m ≤ log n slices.
(iii) For all instances x of A it holds that: x ∈ A if and only if
Essentially, the function f takes the AC 1 circuit C |x| with input x and transforms it to an alternating slice graph G x . The goal node t x represents exactly the bits of x that are 1. The start node s x corresponds to the output gate of C |x| , and apath Gx (s x , t x ) expresses that C |x| accepts input x.
If we consider AsAgap log as the subset of AsAgap where the slice graphs have logarithmic depth, this lemma expresses that AsAgap log is AC 1 -hard under logspace reductions. 
Alternating slice graphs and intuitionistic Kripke models. Our hardness results rely on a transformation of instances G, s, t of AsAgap to intuitionistic Kripke models
An example of the following construction is given in Figure 4 .1. For every i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , m − 1, we construct two sets of states
and let
Every edge (u, v) from E G is transformed to an edge (u out , v in ) from an out-node to an in-node, and every in-node has an edge to its corresponding out-copy. This yields the set of edges
Let G = (W, E) be the graph obtained in this way from G. If we consider those nodes v x ∈ W as ∃-nodes (resp. ∀-nodes) that come from nodes v ∈ V ∃ (resp. v ∈ V ∀ ), then apath G (u, v) IPC 1 model checking is AC 1 -complete 657 canonical model. First, we add only those edges between these nodes that do not disturb the "slice graph" property, namely
Note that H consists of the edges from H 4m−2 that give the canonical model its typical structure, i.e., is the transitive and reflexive closure of H. Second, we add edges from every node in W x i to a node one slice above from the added H 4m−2 .
is still a slice graph with the slices mentioned above. It is depicted in Figure 4. 1. An intuitionistic Kripke model must be transitive and reflexive. The reduction function that transforms alternating slice graphs to intuitionistic Kripke models must be computable in logarithmic space. Within this space bound, we cannot compute the transitive closure of a graph. Therefore, we make the graph transitive with brute force. We add all edges that jump over at least one slice-we call these edges pseudotransitive.
Finally, we need to add all reflexive edges.
Eventually, the relation R for our model is
and the valuation function for our model is The states from the canonical model were added to the slice graph in order to obtain control over the model indices of the other states (w.r.t. the model M G ). Our controlling tool is the function h which is defined in the previous section. It maps every state of an intuitionistic Kripke model to its model index. This is described by the following proposition. 
4i + 2, otherwise.
(2)
(4)
4i + 1, otherwise.
Proof. For the proof, note that h is the identity on the states of the embedded canonical model, since no edges traverse from there to the other nodes (i.e. h(M G , j) = j for all j ∈ U \ W ). Now we prove the proposition by induction on the slices of M G . For the base case, we consider v ∈ W out 0 , where we have
For the induction step, we consider the remaining slices.
(
2 ) = 4i + 1. Furthermore, from the induction hypothesis and the construction of M G , it follows for all
for even i and apath G (v, t) does not hold. Since (v in , 4i + 2) ∈ R and h(M G , 4i + 2) = 4i + 2, we get that ∃u 1 , u 2 ∈ U v in ↑ : h(M G , u 1 ) = 4i and h(M G , u 2 ) = 4i−1. Furthermore, from the induction hypothesis and the construction of
for even i with apath G (v, t) . From apath G (v, t) and the induction hypothesis, it follows for all
Furthermore, from the induction hypothesis and the con-
for even i and apath G (v, t) does not hold. Since (v out , 4i−1) ∈ R and h(M G , 4i−1) = 4i−1, we get that
It follows from the definition of apath and the induction hypothesis that there exists some 
The proof for cases (5) to (8) for odd i (∃ slices) is analogous.
Let g denote the function that maps instances x = G, s, t of AsAgap to intuitionistic Kripke models g(x) = M G as described above. The following properties of g are easy to verify. Proof. In order to show the P-hardness of the problem, we give a reduction from the P-hard problem AsAgap. From an instance G, s, t of AsAgap where G is an alternating slice graph with m slices, construct M G = g ( G, s, t ) . This construction is logspace computable (Lemma 4.3(i) Note that it is already P-hard to decide the last bit of the model index.
In the construction of the above proof, the decision whether h(M G , s out ) = 4m − 2 is the same as to decide whether M G , s out |= ϕ 4m−3 , for the Rieger-Nishimura formula ϕ 4m−3 . (It follows from
) Unfortunately, the length of ϕ 4m−3 is exponential in m (Lemma 3.1), and therefore, the mapping from G, s, t (with m slices) to the model checking instance ϕ 4m−3 , g ( G, s, t ) , s out cannot in general be performed in logarithmic space. But if the depth m of the slice graph is logarithmic, the respective formula ϕ 4m−3 has polynomial size only and the reduction works in logarithmic space. Proof. Let B be in AC 1 . By Lemma 4.1, there exists a logspace computable function f B such that for all instances x of B, x ∈ B if and only if f B (x) ∈ AsAgap, where f B (x) = G x , s x , t x for an alternating slice graph G x with n x nodes and m x ≤ log n x slices. The following function r reduces B to the model checking problem for IPC 1 .
The function r can be computed in logspace. Since f B and g (Lemma 4.3(i)) are logspace computable, it follows that g(f B (x)) and s out x can be computed in logspace. The Rieger-Nishimura formula ϕ 4mx−3 can also be computed in logspace, because m x is logarithmic in |x| and therefore ϕ 4mx−3 has length polynomial in |x|.
B 
Some notes on superintuitionistic logics with one variable
Superintuitionistic propositional logics are logics that have more valid formulas than IPC. In this sense, classical propositional logic is a superintuitionistic logic, since it can be obtained as the closure under substitution and modus ponens of the tautologies from IPC plus a ∨ ¬a as an additional axiom. A well-studied superintuitionistic logic is KC (Dummett & Lemmon 1959) that results from adding the weak law of the excluded middle ¬a ∨ ¬¬a to IPC. Semantically, the intuitionistic Kripke models for KC are restricted to those intuitionistic Kripke models M = (W, , ξ) where is a directed preorder. Whereas IL 1 over preorders has infinitely many equivalence classes of formulas, IL 1 over directed preorders has only 7 equivalence classes-represented by the Rieger-Nishimura formulas ⊥, , ϕ 1 , ψ 1 , ϕ 2 , ψ 2 , ϕ 3 -that can be distinguished using the first 3 canonical models (Makinson 1966; Nishimura 1960 ). This follows from ¬a ∨ ¬¬a ≡ ψ 3 . The function h can be implemented for such models as an alternating Turing machine that runs in logarithmic time, if the function value is fixed to a finite range-in this case {1, 2, 3}-independent of the input. For KC 1 , the Rieger-Nishimura index of the formulas also has a finite range (as mentioned above). Therefore, it can be calculated by an alternating Turing machine that runs in logarithmic time similar to the machine presented by Buss et al. (1992) 
With similar arguments as for KC 1 , we can conclude that the model checking problems of these logics all are in NC 1 . Moreover, the formula value problem for Boolean formulas without variables is NC 1 -hard (Buss et al. 1992) . Intuitionistic formulas without variables have the same values, if they are interpreted as classical Boolean formulas. This means, the semantics of → is the same for Boolean formulas and for intuitionistic formulas without variables. Therefore, the model checking problem for any superintuitionistic logic without variables is NC 1 -hard, too. The validity problem for superintuitionistic logic has the same complexity, since in order to decide whether a formula with one variable is valid it suffices to know its Rieger-Nishimura index.
Conclusion
We consider computational problems that concern with intuitionistic propositional logic without variables and with one variable. We characterize the complexity of model checking for intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 6.1.
(i) The model checking problem for IPC 0 is NC 1 -complete.
(ii) The model checking problem for IPC 1 is AC 1 -complete.
Part (i) follows from the fact that an intuitionistic formula that contains constants ⊥ and but no variables can be evaluated like a Boolean formula, whose evaluation problem is NC 1 -complete (Buss et al. 1992) independently of the number of variables. Part (ii) follows from Theorems 4.5 and 3.7. It shows a difference between IPC 1 and its modal companion S4 with one variable, for which the model checking problem is P-complete (Mundhenk & Weiss 2010) .
Intuitionistic logic with one variable turns out to be very interesting. There are infinitely many equivalence classes of formulas, and according to Lemma 3.1, even the sequence of smallest formulas of these equivalence classes has an exponential growth cc 23 (2014) with respect to the length of the formulas. Such a fast-growing sequence seems to appear rarely in "natural" problems, and it is a key ingredient for the AC 1 -completeness of the model checking problem. Intuitionistic logic with one variable is strongly related to free Heyting algebras with one generator. Since Heyting algebras are generalizations of Boolean algebras, it would be interesting to investigate whether the difference between NC 1 and AC 1 is related to that between Boolean algebras and Heyting algebras.
For the calculation of model indices, we can conclude the following from Theorems 3.6 and 4.4. Two states are equivalent if they satisfy exactly the same formulas respectively-if we consider models with one variable-they have the same model index. From Theorem 6.2, it follows that the problem to decide for given models M 1 and M 2 and states w 1 from M 1 and w 2 from M 2 "Does M 1 , w 1 |= φ ⇔ M 2 , w 2 |= φ hold for all φ ∈ IL 1 ?" (i.e. "Are w 1 and w 2 equivalent?") is P-complete.
It follows fromŠvejdar (2009) and Lemma 3.3 that the validity problem for IL 1 formulas is in SPACE(log n·log log n)∩LOGdetCFL. A lower bound for this problem remains open. It is PSPACEcomplete for formulas with at least two variables (Rybakov 2006 This follows from the discussion in Section 5. It is interesting to notice that the complexity results for IPC and for KC with at least two variables are the same for the model checking problem (Mundhenk & Weiss 2012) . But for the fragments with one variable, the complexity of IPC 1 is higher than that of KC 1 .
The fragments of IPC with a restricted number of variables and → as the only connective have finitely many equivalence classes of formulas and models (de Lavalette et al. 2012; Urquhart 1974) . The equivalence class of a given formula can be calculated with cc 23 (2014) IPC 1 model checking is AC 1 -complete 665 the resources of NC 1 , using the technique from Buss et al. (1992) . This might indicate an upper bound lower than P for the model checking problem. For the implicational fragment with at most one variable, NC 1 -completeness follows from Section 5. But a general result for an arbitrary number of variables is open.
For the validity problem, we obtain the following results.
Theorem 6.4.
(i) The validity problem for every superintuitionistic logic with one variable is NC 1 -complete.
(ii) The validity problem for IPC 1 is in SPACE(log n · log log n) ∩ LOGdetCFL.
Part (i) follows from the discussion in Section 5. Part (ii) is from Svejdar (2009) and Lemma 3.3. The exact complexity of the validity problem for IPC 1 is open. We conjecture that is intermediate between NC 1 and L. It is interesting to notice that superintuitionistic logics with one variable all have lower complexity than IPC 1 , whereas for superintuitionistic logics with two variables already KC reaches the same complexity as IPC (follows from Rybakov 2006 ).
If we consider other problems related to Kripke models for IPC 1 that are not "overwhelmed" by a very fast-growing part of the input, the complexity jumps up to P-completeness, as shown in Theorem 4.4. Model checking for IPC 1 also gets P-hard if the instances φ, M, s allow the formula φ to be represented as a directed acyclic graph, where parents can share children representing common subformulas. This holds even for formulas without variables, and therefore, it also holds for all superintuitionistic logics. If formulas are represented as graphs, the sequence of smallest representatives of the equivalence classes of IPC 1 does not have exponential growth anymore. For some examples see Figure 6 .1. Moreover, the calculation of the Rieger-Nishimura index gets P-hard, because such a calculation can be seen as circuit evaluation of polynomial size circuits. Parts (i) and (ii) contrast the different upper bounds NC 1 and AC 1 for the standard encodings of formulas (Theorem 6.3 resp. Theorem 6.1). Part (ii) holds, because the evaluation of graph represented formulas without variables in classical propositional logic corresponds to circuit evaluation of polynomial size circuits which is known to be P-hard (Ladner 1975) . Parts (iii) and (iv) contrast the complexity of the validity problems for the logics under consideration (Theorem 6.4).
